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Abstract : The paper first examines how the growth rate conditions 
for sustainable deficits are applied to economies with both 
domestic and foreign debt and to alternative exchange rate 
regimes. These conditions are then analysed in the case of Greek 
economy in the 1980s. The impact of the fiscal expansion of 
1981 - 1985 and the devaluation of 1985 on the already 
accumulating process of debt are studied and conclusions are 
























































































































































































Governments who persistently run budget deficits should 
ensure that the accumulated debt to the private sector does not 
eventually reach uncontrollable levels that will make the state 
to loose the confidence of the lenders and perhaps lead to 
explosive social situations. Usually a deficit is considered 
sustainable if it leads to finite debt-to-output ratios, although 
how such a reasonable ratio is defined depends critically on the 
political values and the institutional framework of the society. 
In advanced economies with trustworthy governments and well- 
developed financial markets the public is willing to hold high 
levels of governments debt (for a recent cross-country comparison 
see Roubini and Sachs, 1989). in contrast with third-world 
societies where individuals are very cautious in accepting state 
liabilities, as they fear that the state will eventually renege 
on its obligations.
For a country with no foreign debt liabilities, 
sustainability is ensured by the celebrated condition of an 
output growth rate higher than the real rate of interest paid to 
debt holders. Depending on how much these two rates differ, net 
budget deficits as proportions to output are by no means required 
to be zero, since the growing character of the economy makes the 
interest payments a matter of decreasing importance relative to 
the production capacity of the country.
In situations of stagnation, this condition is not met. In 
fact, high real interest rates might themselves be the primary 
cause of slow growth (see Fitoussi and Le Cacheux, 1989), and 
interest payments will absorb an increasing part of the stagnant 




























































































deficit is zero! Such situations may be corrected only through 
restraining fiscal action (Blinder and Solow, 1973) the relative 
intensity of which varies proportionally to the size of the debt- 
output ratio.
Therefore, one has to look at the interactions between debt, 
deficits and the economy as a whole in order to draw conclusions 
about the importance of the former. As Buiter (1989) has clearly 
pointed out, to use only the deficit as a measure of the debt 
problem may be grossly misleading, since it is a poor or even 
perverse indicator of shortrun cyclical effects, does not reveal 
the allocative or structural impact of fiscal policies, and 
conveys little or no information on the longrun consistency of 
fiscal stance.
In economies with external deficits the traditional medicine 
has been the devaluation of the currency that, given that the 
Marsha1-Lerner conditions are satisfied, improves the trade 
balance and thus relieves the foreign liabilities of the country. 
However, the foreign debt measured as a proportion of domestic 
output is worsened by devaluation because of the revaluation 
effect on the liabilities that are customarily contracted at 
foreign currency. This is due to the worsening of the terms of 
trade caused by devaluation if one considers foreign debt as an 
analogous to imports with zero price elasticity, i.e. one that 
the country is obliged to "buy".
When the foreign debt is very high, the revaluation-induced 
deterioration in domestic terms might be close or even outrun the 
improvements coming from better trade opportunities. In the 
extreme case this leads to a "debt trap" in which devaluations




























































































the other hand appreciations in such cases would lack credibility 
and fuel speculative attacks, so that there seems to be no viable 
policy for the country; see Christodoulakis, Meade and Weale 
(1986) for an analysis of this situation. Even when a country is 
safely away from a debt trap, devaluations may not be pursued by 
governments that give priority to lower inflation (see Van der 
Ploeg, 1989) or when they believe that foreign trade deficits are 
compensated by increased capital inflows motivated by the 
appreciated currency, as has been the case of the US and the UK 
economies in the '80s.
In the real world, there are economies that have accumulated 
debt both domestically and abroad, due to chronic budget and 
current account deficits respectively. It is easily obtained by 
extension that these deficits would be sustainable, were the 
economy growing faster than both domestic and foreign real 
interest rate. If this is not the case, a sophisticated mix of 
fiscal and exchange rate measures should be adopted to correct 
the internal and external imbalances.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the interconnections 
of domestic and foreign debts and derive the conditions under 
which deficits are sustainable. By properly including the 
revaluation effects on foreign liabilities, the growth rate 
conditions depend on the exchange rate policy. Exchange rate 
also affects the inflation rate. The latter has crucial 
implications for the financing of the domestic debt, through the 
inflation tax and the adjustment of real balances held by the 
private sector. In this generalised framework, three alternative 
exchange rate regimes are examined, namely Purchasing Power 




























































































Under very conventional assumptions about monetary policy and 
price/wage formation it is found that the growth condition of 
sustainability is easier to be satisfied under fixed nominal 
exchange rates rather than in the other two regimes. For a 
debted and inflationary-prone country, this is effected by 
exploiting the stock-reducing appreciation effects on foreign 
debt and by the private sector willingness to hold higher real 
balances at the lower inflation rate.
The cost that the country has to pay in such circumstances is 
a larger trade deficit due to the appreciated currency. However 
this may partly be alleviated if one assumes that the erosion of 
competitiveness caused by appreciation is eventually regained 
through a darwinian adjustment at the microeconomic level of the 
firms that face adverse market conditions. Another improvement 
will come from the reduction of economy-wide distortions due to 
inflation, as has been described by Fischer and Modigliani 
(1978).
In Section 2 a simple model is set up for the dynamics of 
domestic and foreign debt. Sustainability conditions are derived 
for the three exchange rate regimes by means of standard 
stability analysis.
In Section 3 these results are used to examine the domestic 
and foreign debt positions for the economy of Greece in the 
1980s. Growth rate has been substantially lower than foreign 
real interest rates during the period and this alone could 
possibly explain the spiralling rise of debt stocks. There took 
place, however, two major episodes with serious further 




























































































The first was the unprecedented fiscal expansion between 1981 
-1985 initiated in 1981 by the incumbent Conservative government 
facing the prospect of defeat in the approaching elections, and 
continued by the Socialist Government at an equally unrestrained 
pace. After four years, the Socialist government felt the need 
of a devaluation-cum-wage-freezing policy package mainly aiming 
to improve the deteriorating trade deficit. Both of these 
episodes are analysed as decision problems of governments who 
seek to achieve certain macroeconomic objectives in the short and 
medium run. It is shown that neglecting the dynamic interactions 
of stocks or the adverse effect of revaluations may result to a 
failure to stabilize the domestic and foreign debt, especially 
when governments are preoccupied by short-term objectives and 
heavily discount future consequences of their decisions. 
Possible combinations of budget deficits and rates of inflation 
are considered diagramatically.





























































































2. THE DYNAMICS QF DEBT
A small open economy with both domestic and foreign debt is 
considered in this section. Although the model is quite general, 
it has been conceived in order to analyse the debt problem of the 
Greek economy highlighting particular episodes of the last 
decade. Some assumptions and parameter values reflect this 
particuliarity. Domestic debt consists of base money with zero 
nominal interest, and bills that bear a nominal interest rate. 
For easiness of presentation the latter are considered as one- 
period Treasury bills. Both of these assets are owned by the 
domestic private sector, who otherwise is deprived of holding any 
foreign asset. Assuming that foreign exchange reserves are held 
constant, e.g. to a fixed proportion of the country’s imports, 
the only foreign asset that matters in the economy is the foreign 
debt borne intally by the government.
The economy is assumed to grow at a real rate not necessarily 
positive which is exogenously determined. There are imports of 
both production and consumption goods, and their corresponding 
prices are influenced by the international ones. Combined with a 
Phi 11ips-curve process of partial real wages resistance, prices 
are fully determined as a markup on costs. Capital stock is 
assumed constant throughout so that changes in private wealth are 
effected through portfolio choices between money and bills.
To examine the dynamics of domestic and foreign debt, we 
first express them as proportions to the country's output and 
then derive their adjustment process in continuous-time from the 




























































































2.1. List of Variables
B=b. Y Real Budget Deficit, net of interest payments
H=h.Y Real Interest-bearing debt held by domestic private sector
M=m. Y Real High-powered money, non-interest bearing
F=f. Y Real Foreign debt of the government, expressed in domestic 
currency
V=v. Y Real Financial wealth of domestic private sector
Y Real GDP, at factor cost
g Output growth rate (g=dY/Y)
J-j.Y Trade balance in real terms at domestic prices
E Nominal exchange rate, price of foreign currency 
(Depreciation e = dE/E)
P GDP deflator (Inflation p = dP/P)
C Consumer Price Index (Consumption inflation c = dC/C)
W Nominal Wage Rate (Wage Inflation w = dW/W)
X Real Exchange Rate (Real depreciation x = dX/X)
i. (i*) Domestic (foreign) nominal interest rates
r ,(r*) Domestic (foreign) real Interest rates
P* Foreign prices (Foreign Inflation p* = dP*/P*)
Stock and flow variables are all in real terms and denoted by 
capital letters. Respective low-case characters express them as 
ratios to output. Price variables are denoted by capital 
letters, with low case ones expressing their corresponding rates 
of change. The growth rate and the interest rates are also 
denoted by low case characters. A starred variable denotes the




























































































The government budget constraint between time period t and 
t+dt states that gross deficit is financed by issuing new bills 
or creating new non-interest-bearing money. In current prices it 
is written:
B*P* + it HtPt + i?(FtPt/Et)(Et+dE) - d(PtHt) + d(PtMt) (1)
In the left-hand-side gross deficit includes the net deficit 
(BtPt). interest payments on domestically held debt, and the 
interest payments on the foreign debt. Foreign debt is borne in 
foreign currency, and interest payments are calculated on the 
value of the stock at the begining of the period t. However, 
these interest payments in foreign currency should be translated 
into domestic prices at the prevailing exchange rate at (t+dt), 
thus including possible devaluations since period (t). In this 
way, revaluations of foreign stocks are properly taken into 
account.
In the above form, the right-hand-side of equation (1) does 
not exclude the possibility of financing the debt by borrowing 
from abroad. The government may for example run down foreign 
exchange reserves to partly finance the deficit. Assuming 
accomodating monetary policy at home, money supply is going to 
increase by an equivalent amount and this is presicely captured 
in equation (1). Reserves are then restored to their original 
levels by borrowing from abroad at the nominal interest rate i*.
Dividing (1) by nominal GDP (=PtY*), employing the low-case 
notation for variables-to-output ratios and rates of change of 
prices, and using the dot(•) to denote time derivatives we arrive 
at the following form:




























































































ht + mt = (r-g+s)ht + (r*-g+x)ft - (p+g)mt + b* (2)
where s=c-p is the wedge between inflation rates in consumer 
prices and domestic product prices respectively. The other 
variables are explained below:
Real exchange rate is defined as the relative price of 
foreign and domestic product:
X = P*E/P (3)
Thus we get for the real devaluation rate per period
x = e + p* - p (4)
Real interest rates are obtained by deflating nominal ones by 
consumer inflation 
1 + i
r = ---- - 1 *> i - c* (5)
1+c"
where c° is the expected value of c.
For the foreign interest rates we do not distinguish between 
consumer and product inflation as country's exports are 
negligible amount of world consumptions so we shall have
r *  «  i *  _  p * ( 6 )
The inflation wedge (s) can be easily expressed in terms of 
the real devaluation (x) by considering the following equations 
of inflation formation:
c = (l-a)p + a(e+p*) (7)
p - (l-B)w + B(e+p*) (6)
w = u + Ac* (9)
Equation (7) comes from a weighted average price index 
between domestically produced and imported goods, and is exact 
for Cobb-Douglas utility functions. Equation (8) expresses 




























































































and is exact for Cobb-Douglas production functions. Finally (9) 
is an augmented Phillips curve determining wage inflation from 
expected consumer inflation (c«*) and an autonomous inflation term 
u that reflects supply constraints in the Labour market, 
productivity gains etc, and is assumed exogenous throughout.
Assuming perfect foresight (c=c®), and partial indexation 
(0< A<1) we can combine the above set of equations with (4) to 
get :
s = ax (10)
u
P - --- + 5x (11)
1- A




To obtain a more manageable form of (2) we can assume that 
the private sector holds real balances to an interest-elastic 
proportion of the interest-bearing debt:
m = ip ( i)h (12)
with ip'(i) < 0. Given that the private sector does not hold any 
kind of foreign assets, total financial wealth will be composed 
of only two assets, money and bills. In terms of ratios to 
output we shall have:
v = m + h (13)
Hence, (12) is equivalent to assuming (as in Dornbusch,1977) that 
real balances are kept as an interest-elastic proportion of total 
portfolio, namely 
m ip (i)
- = ------ (14)
v l+(p(i)



























































































Function ip(-) is in general non-linear, and should imply 
(p(oo) =0 so that no money is held at excessively high nominal 
interest rates.
Dropping the argument from ip(-) for simplicity we can use 
(10) and (12) to rewrite (2) as
11
r 1 - P - ~lh x I
r r*-g+x .1 b
L i+ip r T  1L  i+ip J 1+cp
where i = r+p+ax.
This expression says that domestic debt as a proportion to 
output rises because of interest payments at home and abroad, and 
because of running budget deficits (b). It also rises when 
interest rates rise and the private sector reduces real balances 
that have to be covered by further issues of interest bearing 
bills.
2.3. The External Account
In the external account of the country, foreign debt will 
rise in order to finance a deficit of the current balance or will 
be reduced whenever the latter is in surplus. In foreign 
currency terms we have the following stock-flow constraint for 
the time period between t and t+dt:
(Ft+dFt)(Pt+dPt) FtPt Jt(Pt+dPt)
----------------  - (1 + i*)---- - ----------  = 0 (16)
E t + d E t E-t Et+dEfc
where the trade balance is evaluated at domestic prices
prevailing at period t+dt. Dividing by PtVt and dropping the





























































































f = (r*-g+x)f - j (17)
where j denotes the trade balance as a ratio to output. 
Conventionally assuming a consumption function out of income and 
wealth, an export function of relative prices, an import function 
of constant propensity and relative prices and the standard 
fiscal multiplier effect we can approximate the trade balance to 
output ratio as
j = -Kiv - K2b + *3X (18)
with positive constants Ki.Ka.K3, and X denoting the level of 
real exchange rate. Trade balance worsens with a fiscal
expansion represented here by a rise in the bugdet deficit, with 
a rise in wealth through consumption effects and improves with a 
depreciation dX>0. No J-curve effect is assumed.
Using (12), (13) and (18), we rewrite equation (17) as 
f - (l+<p)Kih + (r*-g+x)f + Kab - KaX (20)
which together with (15) determines the dynamics of the stocks of 
the foreign and domestic debt respectively.
Equations (15) and (20) may be used in two ways. First, one 
can assume that the long-run ratios h and f are exogenously 
determined for the given economy, and then derive which are the 
appropriate values for deficit (b) and inflation (p) that are 
sustainable in the longrun. Second, one may take fiscal and 
exchange rate policy as given, work-out the dynamic paths on 
which the stocks move towards their steady-state, and obtain the 



























































































2.4. Sustainable deficits and inflation
We consider here a steady-state with constant ratios h and f. 
a stable real exchange rate (x=dX/X=0) and the assumption that 
authorities always keep a fixed real interest rate. Although 
function ip(i) is meant to change with inflation, we shall further 
assume here that for reasonable inflation rates velocity of money 
does not change, and tp (i) is constant for convenience.
Setting f=0 we obtain from (20) that the longrun sustainable 
net deficit is given by:
This equation reveals the policy options available for a 
debted country. In order to continue to run budget deficits 
(b>0) the country has either to grow fast so that g>r*, or to 
substantially depreciate its currency (X >0) in order to 
accumulate trade surpluses.
Otherwise, it will have to run budget surpluses (b<0) which 
are going to cut down demand and eventually decumulate the 
foreign debt.
The locus of (21) is shown in Figure 1 by the horizontal line 
X'X'. If the currency becomes relatively appreciated (X2<Xi) 
the locus shifts downwards (X ''X '‘) requiring a cut in the 
longrun deficit (b2<bi).
The other locus in the deficit-inflation space is obtained 
from equation (15) by setting x=0, h=0 and i=r+p as follows:
b = ip hp - (r - g(l+(p))h + (g-r*)f (22)
and is also shown in Figure 1 by the line h'h'.





























































































interest, this relationship reveals a link between inflation and 
sustainable deficits similar to that derived by Congdon (1987) in 
a static framework.
Figure 1: Sustainable inflation and budget deficits.
A higher deficit is sustainable only at a higher inflation 
rate. Conversely, a reduction in inflation will come about with a 
cut in budget deficit as shown in Figure 1 by the downward shift 
of the horizontal line (inflation P2<Px), effected by a relative 
appreciation (X2<Xx).
Another way to reduce longrun inflation is to raise h, so 
that the amount of public debt that the public is now willing to 
hold is higher (h2>hi). The slope of (22) increases and the 
intersection with the horizontal locus is obtained at a point of 
lower inflation (P3). The X'X' locus hardly moves in this case 
as propensity Ki is usually very small.
A final possibility for a fast-growing economy to run higher 
deficits without spurring inflation is to increase the foreign 




























































































X'X'and h'h' move upwards as (21) and (22) indicate for g>r*. and 
sustainable deficit (b) increases. This however is not possible 
for economies with a growth rate lower than the foreign interest 
rate. The shift will now be downwards and sustainability will 
require lower budget deficits and a higher inflation rate in the 
longrun.
The above analysis clearly demonstrates the remarks made by 
Congdon (1987) that:
" ..the government economy with a strong domestic demand for government debt 
and considerable external credit worthiness can, on a sustained basis, run a 
higher budget deficit to income ratio without inflation than that of an economy 
with weak domestic demand for government debt and little external
creditworthiness. A buoyant trend rate of economic growth also obivates the 
inflationary dangers of budget deficits" (my italics).
In the more general case, where money function ip(i) is more 
sensitive to inflation, the locus h'h' becomes a concave curve 
that might intersect the locus X'X' twice. and lead to multiple 
inflation equilibria as studied by Dornbusch and Fischer (1986), 
and Drazen and Helpman (1988) among others. However, for 
countries still away from hyperinflation this does not seem to be 
a realistic case to consider.
2.5. Conditions for debt stability
The next question is under which circumstances the debt does 
not explode in the long-run. This is best analysed by studying 
the stability conditions of equations (15) and (20). Naturally, 




























































































policy, and also on the mechanism by which exchange rates are 
determined.
Here we shall assume that fiscal policy is exogenously fixed 
by keeping the budget deficit at a constant proportion (b) of 
output. Monetary policy manipulates the interest rates so that 
real interest rates are kept constant and money supply equals 
demand determined by (12) . Inflation is determined in the goods 
and labour markets and, with the incomes policy parameter A 
fixed, is given in every period by expression (11). In this way 
inflation rate depends on the depreciation rate. Three exchange 
rate regimes are in turn examined :
Regime I: Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), by keeping the real 
exchange rate fixed. In this case we shall have for the real 
depreciation:
x = 0 (23a) 
Regime 11: Nominal Exchange Rate Stability (NES). For a small 
economy this is a close proxy to a multi-country scheme with 
agreed intramember parities. The obvious contemporary example is 
the European Monetary System (EMS). Parities towards outside 
currencies are in practice decided by the strong members of the 
system and are not influenced by the small country. In this case 
we shall have e=0, so that according to (4) real depreciation 
will at every period be given by:
x=p*-p (23b) 
Regime III: Floating exchange rate (FER). Assuming perfect 
capital mobility, this regime is typified with the uncovered 
interest parity condition. In real terms and under the 
accompanying assumption of rational expectation this condition 




























































































Other cases like a managed nominal exchange rate, a managed real 
one, etc. can similarly be considered, although the emerging 
expressions might not be as neat.
Given that inflation rate is endogenously affected by real 
depreciation only. that real interest rates are fixed and that 
output growth rate is exogenously determined the dynamics of the 
debt stocks (h.f) are solely governed by their own interaction. 
Equations (15) and (20) form a second-order dynamic system which 
is asymptotically stable if and only if the trace of the 
associated characteristic matrix is negative and its determinant 
positive, (see Appendix A). Namely, we require 
i
(r*+x-g) + --- - p - g < 0 (24)
1+ip
( r * + x - g )  [  ------ - p - g - K i l  > 0  ( 2 5 )
L l+ip J
These conditions are satisfied when the output growth-rate is 
higher than the maximum of the three values implied by the right- 
hand-side of the following inequalities:
x=r-r* (23c)
g > r* + x (26a )
i
g > --- - p -- Hi (26b)l+(p
1 r i Tg > — r*+x+ --- - p] (26c)2 L 1+cp J
With a low propensity to consume out of wealth (Hi— >0) the
third condition becomes redudant since it can be obtained by 
adding up the first two. In the rest of this Section we shall 




























































































These conditions are generalisations of the well-known 
condition on the growth rate derived for a closed economy.<*>
Condition (26a) requires a minimum growth rate determined by 
the foreign interest rate and thus may be seen as representing 
the external constraint.
Condition (26b) gives the minimum growth rate as a function 
of domestic policy factors, thus representing a kind of internal 
constraint.
Both constraints are crucially affected by the depreciation 
rate (x). Using (5) and (10) we can rewrite them according to 
the exchange rate regime in terms of the constant real interest 
rate and inflation as follows:
External Constraint Internal ConaUl&iat
r - pip
Regime I, (PPP) r* ------ - ii
l+ip
r-(ip+a)p+ap*
Regime II.(NES) r*+p*-p ------------  * U
l+ip
(1+a) r-ar"-pip
Regime III, (FER) r -------------  - Kx
l+ip
Let us examine first the external constraint in the three 
regimes. If the debted country is prone to inflation then the 
external constraint is less difficult to be attained in NES 
rather than in PPP. This is because of the fact that domestic 
inflation is higher than abroad, thus the currency will actually 
be appreciated and revaluations of the foreign debt will be
<*> They also generalise the conditions derived in an earlier paper by 
Christodoulakis, Meade and Weale (1986) for an open economy with domestic 
and foreign assets, but under the more restrictive assumptions of zero 




























































































reducing the stock to output ratio. The process of foreign debt 
accumulation will be stabilised, but its steady state might be 
considerably higher due to the continuous deterioration of trade 
balance. Quick microeconomic adjustment will help to partly 
alleviate this problem. Had the trade balance been assumed to 
have the J-curve property, appreciation would have an improving 
effect in the shortrun, that c<?uld result in lower levels of 
foreign debt.
The floating regime is superior to PPP only when the debted 
country follows a relaxed monetary policy with real domestic 
interest rates lower than foreign ones. This however is not 
likely to last for long, because it induces capital flights away 
from the debted country, which further deteriorate the current 
account and force real interest rates to rise above the foreign 
ones in order to counterbalance the associated risk premia.
Under the assumptions of a debted inflationary country with 
higher real interest rates than abroad, the easiness to satisfy 
the external contraint is ranked as follows:
NES > PPP > FER
with > denoting preference in the above sense.
The internal constraint is primarily determined by domestic 
real interest rates, inflation and. except in PPP, by the share 
of imports in consumption. It also depends on the specific 
nature of the inverse velocity function ip (i). Two alternative 
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Case I: Assuming**» that velocity is a function of real interest 
rates only, then we have <p=ip(r)“constant and the minimum growth 
rate implied by the internal constaint becomes:
i
9m In = ------ — P Hi
l+ip(r)
and by using (10) and (11)
r 1>u 19min - (1+ip)-1 H 1 (1+ip) + (cc-ipS) x - ---J (27)
When the debted country is inflationary prone (p>p*) and keeps 
higher real interest rates than abroad (r>r*), we can rank the 
three exchange regimes according to the sign of expression (cl­
ips) .
- For a high velocity of money (i.e. low cp(r )) such that
cp (r) < a/6
we have the following ranking of the relative easiness to 
satisfy the internal constraint under the three exchange rate 
regimes:
NES > PPP > FER
- For low velocities, such that ip(r)>cc/6 the ranking becomes
FER > PPP > NES
'*> Since real interest rates (r) are fixed, this assumption is equivalent to 





























































































Case 11: Adopting an inverse velocity function similar to that 
suggested by Cagan (1956)
ip(i ) = k e— 1 (28)
and setting the nominal interest rates from (5) equal to 
i = r + c e = r + p + a x
one can calculate the domestically required minimum growth rates 
in the three exchange rate regimes. Keeping our assumption on 
higher domestic inflation than abroad (p>p*) we plot the three 
functions at various levels of p for the alternative cases of 
real interest rates higher or lower than the corresponding 
foreign ones, and for reasonable values imposed on other 
variables (a=0.25, 6=0.60).
r*=0.04, p*=0.03, r=0.06 and 0.03; k=0.20, v=10).
At any given rate of domestic inflation Figures 2a and 2b
reveal the following ranking of the relative easiness to satisfy 
the internal constraint on the growth rate:
NES > PPP > FER
However, inflation rate is itself determined by the exchange 
rate regime according to equation (11). This makes the internal 
constraint in each regime a function of the indexation parameter 
(/)) and the autonomous rate of wage inflation (u) . for a 
mumerical illustrating we fix u at 4% per annum, and we obtain 
the minimum growth rates for various degrees of indexation in 
Figures 3a and 3b. Again NES regime is superior to the other 
two, given that domestic inflation remains substantially higher 
than abroad.
Stability conditions (26) may imply unattainable growth rates 
when real interest rates are too high. With money velocity 




























































































and (28), rising inflation is not an effective strategy to 
satisfy the internal constraint. When inflation is approaching 
hyper levels the public is unwilling to hold real balances 
(ip(i) —  >0) and the gains from inflation tax completely evaporate 
due to the Laffer curve property of function (28), (pip(i) —  >0, as 
P— >“>) .
In such circumstances there are two policy options left for 
the goverment in order to restore long-run stability:
(i) Active fiscal policy. An optimal strategy may be devised to 
manipulate the fiscal variable b(t) in relation to the deviations 
of the debt stocks from some desired levels. Naturally, it would 
imply budgetary cuts in periods of rising debt, and expansionist 
policies when debt stocks are sufficiently reduced.
(ii) Managed exchange rate policy. Depreciation rate is set in 
each period according to a rule that looks after the foreign 
exchange position of the country. This policy may be 
supplemented by some fiscal activism aiming to achieve targets of 
nominal demand.
The dynamics of the above framework, announcement problems 
associated with rational agents in the currency markets. and 
issues of foreign exchange intervention to sustain the 
credibility of such policies are extensively analysed elsewhere 
(e.g. in Weale et.al,. 1989) and are not pursued here any 
further.
In the following section we shall try to employ the above 
analysis in order to look at the destabilising debt process of 




























































































3. THE CASE or GREECEiUNSTABLE DYNAMICS AMP POLICY OPTIONS
We consider in this Section the accumulation of domestic and 
foreign debt in Greece during the 1980s. Although both debt 
stocks were kept at very low proportions of output in the 1970s, 
they started rising out of control after the record rise of 
transfer payments before the elections in 1981 and the further 
fiscal expansion that was followed by the new government.
Table 2 shows that at least the external stability condition 
was not satisfied during that period, so that even without these 
expansions, an unsustainable process would have been evolved, 
albeit at a much slower pace.
Below we look at the expansion during 1981 - 1985, and then 
we examine the likely reasons for which the stabilation program 
in 1985 failed to reverse the process.
Case I: The fiscal expansion 1981-85
As the elections of October 1981 were approaching, the 
incumbent Conservative Party started to apply an unrestraint 
fiscal expansion through transfer payments as a strategy to 
attract votes. As a result budget deficit in 1981 rose to a 
record 9.80% of GDP'*» after a period of an average rate of 
around 4% in the previous decade as Table 1 shows. This policy 
continued unabated in the next years as the socialist government 
applied the same method to secure the loyalty of its
'*> According to data of European (1989), net borrowing requirement was 11% in 
1981. The average in 1982-85 was 9.9%. The difference between figures is 




























































































supporters. As a result budget deficits averaged 10.7% of GDP 
between 1982 and 1985.
Foreign debt was very low at that time, and despite the 
rising international alert over Third World debted countries in 
that period there was no serious political consideration of this 
matter in Greece. We can portray this situation by neglecting 
the dynamics of foreign debt in (15) and rewrite the dynamics of 
domestic debt as:
i b _
h = (--- - p - g)h + --- + fx (30)
l+<p l+if>
where fj. should be understood as an exogenously fixed expression.
Authorities were trying to raise the fiscal variable as 
closely as possible to an ideal high level b, while paying less 
attention to keeping the debt close to an acceptable ratio h. 
and completely ignoring the repercussions on foreign debt. Their 








(h-h)2 + 92 (b-b) 2 L. dt (31)
where 6 denotes the discount rate, and qt,q2 express the relative 
weights of debt stabilisation over achieving the desired fiscal 
expansion.
The Hamiltonian is derived from (30) and (31) as
H = - qi(h-h)2 + - q2(b-b)2 + o | (--- - p - g)h + --- + fiL
2 2 L l+tp 1+ip J
where a is the backwards discounted shadow price of debt, 





































































































a - 0o - - —  = -qi(h-h) - a(--- - p - g) (34)3h 1+ip
Solving (33) for a and substituting the resulting expression into 
(34) we get the fiscal rule:
5 l  1 -b = ------  (h-h) + (0 + p + g - ---) (b-b) (35)
q2 (l+l()) l+ip
The process of debt is now governed by the combined dynamics 
of equations (30) and (35). In order to imply a finite steady 
state debt-to- output ratio, the saddle path stability condition 
of one negative and one positive root of the associated 
characteristic polynomial is required. This condition is met 
when the determinant of the associated stability matrix is 
negative, (see Appendix A). In our case it is required:
i i qi
(0 + p + g - ---) (--- - P - g) - ------- < 0 (36)
l+ip 1+ip q2 (l+<p)i 2
When the internal constraint (26.b) is not been satisfied, due to 
high interest rates or low growth, (36) may be easily translated 
into the requirement for a low discount rate 0 so that future 
implications of the fiscal expansions are sufficiently taken into 
account.
However, in 1981 the Greek economy did satisfy the internal 
constraint as the nominal growth rate (p+g) was 19.8 whilst the 
interest rate on 12-month Treasury bills was only 14.25 at that 
time. In fact, this comfort lasted for a few years more until 
interest rates rose to 18* in 1985. Whatever the value of 0, 
determinant condition (36) is satisfied. Had the authorities 
chosen to finance the deficit by selling Treasury bills to the 




























































































occured gradually leading to stationary, though higher, domestic 
debt to output ratio (h). Instead the authorities chose to 
finance the deficit by foreign borrowing and this triggered 
equation (20) .
As real interest rates abroad were substantially higher (eg. 
5% in Germany, 5.9% in USA) than the domestic real growth rate of 
g=0.1%, this sharp rise of foreign debt generated an unstable 
process implied by equation (20). As interest payments started 
to accumulate after a while, domestic debt followed on a 
similarly unstable path.
The consequences of financing a higher budget deficit by 
increasing borrowing from abroad can be illuminated by using the 
static diagram of Section 2. In Figure 4 the position of the 
Greek economy before the fiscal expansion of the 1980s can be 
stated at point A with a budget deficit at 4% of GDP and an 
inflation rate 15%, both taken as the average rates during 1975- 
1980.




























































































With foreign indebtness (f) increased and a growth rate 
lower than foreign interest rates, equation (22) implied a shift 
of the locus (h 'h ') downwards. For the same reason locus (X ’X 1) 
should also move downwards, but this would then require longrun 
budget cuts as has been explained in Section 2. To raise the 
locus in order to achieve a higher sustainable budget deficit, 
the currency had to depreciate substantially as can be worked out 
by (21). The loci are now intersected at a point B where 
inflation is higher than before, the currency depreciated, and 
foreign debt to output ratio risen. Indeed, budget deficit has 
averaged 10.12% of GDP in 1981-85 with an average inflation rate 
20.4%. In the same period the drachma nominal exchange rate 
depreciated by 52% against the US dollar and by 42% against the 
ECU.
Case ii: The 1985 da\a.Lufl£iai)•
By 1985 trade deficit of Greece was rapidly deteriorating and 
the foreign indebtedness of the country started to become a 
standard point of reference in policy debates. A stabilisation 
package was finally announced in October 1985, mainly consisting 
of a discrete devaluation of the drachma by 15% plus a temporary 
freeze in nominal wage increases. Although the announcement 
included a pledge on tax reforms and budgetary cuts. they were 
largely abandoned afterwards, because of the overwhelming 
opposition of pressure groups and, arguably, of administrative 
inefficiency. As can be checked in Table 1 budget deficit 
continued to form a high percent of national product and, after a 
brief spell of containment in 1986 and 1987, it started rising 




























































































simplify the policy problem by considering the fiscal variable 
(b) as exogenously fixed, and solely concentrate on the dynamics 
of the foreign debt equation (20). This equation includes both 
an expression of the current level of real exchange rate (X) and 
its rate of change (x). In order to make an analytic solution 
possible, we try below to express the devaluation effect on the 
trade balance in terms of the depreciation rate only.
Discrete real devaluations (x>0) take the form of one-off 
changes of parities, so equation (18) should also take into 
account past devaluations which continue to affect current 
competitiveness and the trade balance. However, for the case of 
the Greek economy we can assume that devaluations do not change 
the trade-balance-to-output ratio in the long run and a new 
devaluation will be needed to keep it improving. This assumption 
is in agreement with simulation results obtained by estimated 
models of the Greek economy, such as Alogoskoufis (1989) and 
Christodoulakis (1988).
The reasons for this kind of asymptotic neutrality of 
devaluation (or appreciation) may be one or both of the 
following:
(i) Real wage resistance. With indexation approaching full 
scale, competitiveness gains (or losses) evaporate and trade 
balance and output return asymptotically to their initial 
real levels. (See Alogoskoufis, 1989, for further 
elaboration of this effect in the case of Greece).
(ii) Disincentives (or incentives) for microeconomic adjustment 
of compeitiveness. A depreciation (appreciation) of 
currency creates an immediate advantage (disadvantage) in 




























































































(pursue) other ways of improving competitiveness. In the 
longrun they fail (achieve) to keep up with productivity 
changes of foreign producers and trade balance 
asymptotically returns to the initial levels.
A proper way to express the quickly decaying effect of 





with xT being the real devaluation that took place at time x 
(0<x<t) and p is the speed of erosion (or recovery) of 
competitiveness.
If a depreciation takes place at only one time period (say x0 
at t=0), its effect is given from (38) by
i*i(X) = x0e-«t (38a)
The cumulative improvement that this is going to have on the 
stock of foreign debt is obviously proportional to the integral 
of expression (38a) up to infinity:
Xo
Xoe-wt = —  (38b)
JO p
Since in (20) we are solely interested on the total effect 
that a depreciation has on the stock of debt, we can consider 
that this improvement comes instantaneously at time t by an 
amount given by (38b) instead of cumulatively as implied by (20) 
and (38). This allows to simplify equation (20) into:
*3
f - (l+ip)Kih + (r*-g+x)+Kzb - — x (39)
M
The government’s policy may then be approximated by the 
attempt to reduce foreign debt to as close as possible a low 
































































































q3 (f-f)2+q4x2L dt 40)
With 9 denoting the policymakers' discount factor and q3,q4 
the relative priorities between achieving a low level of debt and 
avoiding an excessive devaluation of domestic currency. To 
obtain a tractable result, we choose to further simplify the 
dynamic constraint (20) by linearising the non linear function 
ip(x) = (f>(r+p+ax) and the revaluation term around the initial 
levels of foreign debt (f), domestic debt (h) and depreciation 
(x, which is conveniently assumed to be zero before the 
stabilisation measures). Equation (20) is thus rewritten as
where ^4 =-(cc+S) iip' , h is the opening domestic debt, that
together with hi = Sih + Kzb are given exogenously, and ip' is the 
derivative of function tp(•) evaluated at x=0.
Forming the Hamiltonian. stating the first order conditions 
for devaluation (x) and for the shadow price of foreign debt, and 
proceeding in a manner similar to that of the previous case, we 
finally derive the depreciation rule as 
q3 -
x = —  (f-*4h - k3/m ) (f-f) + (9 - r* + g)x (42)
q->
Again, the foreign-debt process is asymptotically stable if and 
only if the determinant of the stability matrix associated with 
the system of equations (41) and (42) is negative. As with (36) 
this condition is satisfied by a not-too-high discount rate 9.




























































































Alternatively, we may also write the determinant condition in the
form:
- q*
(*a/u + *-»h - f)2 > —  (r* - g) (8 - r’ + g) (41)
qa
With very low initial values of debts h and f, this condition 
is easily identified as a minimum requirement on the 
effectiveness of devaluation, so that improvements in trade 
deficit suffice to asymptotically restore the foreign debt at a 
finite longrun value. However, reality in 1985 was rather 
adverse at this point as the already high opening debt f made 
devaluation to inflict serious debiting revaluations that 
immediately eroded much of the gains reported from the trade 
front. In fact, as Table 1 demonstrates, foreign debt as a ratio 
to output continued to be very high despite the stabilisation 
measures. The trade deficit was only temporarily relieved and by 
the end of 1987 it had nearly returned to pre-stabilisation 
levels, thus demonstrating a longrun insensitivity to 
devaluation.
One of course could argue that far-sighted policy makers 
should choose a zero discount rate 8 in (41) which automatically 
satisfies the condition. This would have implied a stronger 
reaction function for the exchange rate in order to obtain such 
improvements in the trade deficit that were capable of 
outperforming the revaluation effect. To contain the enormous 
devaluation-induced inflation, such an extreme policy should have 
been accompanied by a more radical attack on real wages. But 
that was politically too risky to be undertaken, apart from any 
other objections emanating from the angle of social justice 




























































































The situation can again be portrayed with the aid of the 
diagram in the deficit-inflation space. With the budget deficit 
unchanged, the horizontal line (X'X'J should remain in the same 
longrun position.
Setting f=0 in (41) we obtain that an increase in foreign 
indebtedness (Af, say), has to be matched by a depreciation x 
given by:
r*-g
x = ----------  Af (44)
Ka/p-f+TUh
Depreciation will be stronger, the higher is the opening 
stock of debt or the faster (higher p) is the speed of erosion of 
competitiveness.
The other locus (h'h') does shift. To obtain its equation we 
return to the original expression (15) in order to include the 
depreciation term. Setting i=r+p+ax and h = 0 we get easily an 
angmented form of (22):
b - iphp - [r—g (1 + tp) ]h - (r*-g)f - (ah+f)x (45)
With an increase in x this locus shifts downwards to (h''h'') 
and the new level of sustainable inflation naturally increases, 
(point C in Figure 5).
An alternative way of attacking the rising foreign debt would 
be to cut the budget deficit without depreciating the currency, 
or perhaps even allowing for some temporary appreciation, given 
that Greek inflation rate was in any case higher than that of 
competitor countries even before the stabilization program was 
announced. From (41) we get for the budget cut:




























































































Figure 5 : The inflationary effect of devaluation




























































































With x<0, the budget cut would be lower, the higher the 
opening stock of foreign debt-to-output ratio (f) and the faster 
the recovery from compeitivess setbacks by the producers. Locus 
(X'X) moves downwards, while locus (h’h'J shifts upwards due to 
the likely appreciations working their way through (45). The new 
intersection is now at point D which is consistent with a lower 
budget deficit and a reduced inflation rate, (see Figure 6). As 
inflation gets lower, the exchange rate returns to normal levels, 
thus easing the strain on the trade balance and making the whole 
system all the more sustainable.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Without fiscal activism, a domestic and foreign debt does not 
become explosively high relative to output only when the growth 
rate of the economy exceeds certain bounds determined by domestic 
and foreign interest rates, the velocity of money and the 
exchange rate regime. Exploiting the revaluation effect of an 
appreciated currency, an inflationary-prone country has a better 
chance to meet the minimum growth constraint, by not depreciating 
the exchange rate, given that the trade balance is not 
perpetually deteriorating. Fiscal expansions by shortsighted 
governments trigger the destabilising process of debt 
accumulation, whilst devaluation policies may have adverse 
effects on both the domestic and foreign debt when they ignore 
the burden of revaluations on the latter as a ratio to output. A 
dual policy of nominal exchange rate stability (or at least not 
excessive devaluations) and fiscal restraint seems to 




























































































inflation rate. The trade deficit deterioration implied by the 
former will at least partly be offset by the demand-reducing 
effect of the second measure. However, a fuller model would be 
needed to study further consequences of this policy on output and 
employment, also part of the macroeconomic objectives, before 
concluding about the overall merits. It is possible to emerge 
that nominal exchange rate stability and longrun deficit 
sustainability would allow the domestic interest rates to fall as 
the risk premium on holding government debt will be reduced. A 
reduction in interest rates encourages investment, and thus may 
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1975, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989
Int.Rate, Geraany 8.5 7.8 4.2 5.7 7.4 8.5 10.4 9.0 7.9 7.8 6.9 5.9 5.8 6.1 I
Inflation,6er*any 4.0 3.4 3.7 4.3 4.0 4.8 4,0 4.4 3.3 2.0 2.2 3.1 2.0 1.8 ?  ̂ !
RRI, Geraany 2.5 4.2 2.5 1.4 3.4 3.7 6.4 4.6 4.6 5.8 4.7 2.8 3.8 4.3
Int. Rate, USA 7.0 4.8 7,1 7.9 8.7 10.8 12.9 12.2 10.8 12.0 10.8 8.1 6.7 9.1
Inflation, USA 9.8 6.2 6.7 7.2 8.9 9.1 7.9 6.3 7 7 3.7 3.1 2.6 3.3 3.3 4.6
SRI, USA -2.8 0.4 0.4 0.7 -0.2 1.7 5.0 5.9 7,5 8.3 7.7 5.5 5.2 5.8
Treasury Bill Rate 9.75 9.75 8,25 10.25 14.25 14.25 14.25 15.25 15.25 18.0 18.5 18.5 19.5 19.5
Tonsu.ption Inflation 12.7 13.4 11.9 12.8 14.5 21.6 23.3 21.2 18.2 18.3 18.7 22.2 15.8 13.3 12.8
RRI, 6reece -2.95 -3.45 -3.65 -2.55 -2.25 -7.35 -9.05 -5.95 -2.95 -0.3 -3.7 ~3.7 y 7 6.2
GDP Inflation 12.3 15.4 13 12.9 18.6 17.7 19.8 25.1 19.1 20.3 19.0 19.0 14.3 14,3 13.0
Growth Rate 4.1 4.4 3.4 4.7 3.7 1.8 0.1 0.4 0.4 2.8 1.3 1.3 -0.4 2.8 2.1
:oreign Debt (Si) 3408 3788 4447 4858 5582 7034 8177 9801 11458 11945 15071 17377 19129
IPX/* 32.28 34.89 37.21 37.11 37.42 43.06 55.43 66.78 87.8? 112.72 138.2 139,54 142. 136.
GDP, bnDr 593 728 844 1014 1245 1523 1854 2285 2721 3362 4132 4928 5539
;DR, bnDr 472 825 964 1141 1428 1710 2050 2574 3077 3805 4614 5564 6335 7437 8582
loi.Debt (bn)Br 99 131 144 280 316 362 508 693 082 1260 1645 1943 2574 3704
1oney Supply (HI)bnDr 128 140 187 228 264 313. 386 471 535 651 797 879 1046
"D/6DP = U 14.3 14.9 17.24 15.5 14.6 17.7 22.1 25.4 32.98 35.38 45.14 43.56 42.87
ID/60P = hi 14.7 15.8 17.2 24.1 22.4 21.2 24.7 27.0 28.7 33.1 35.6 34,9 40.6 49.8
Trade Deficit 
($«)
3.04 3.33 3.90 4.33 6.177 6.809 6.697 5.927 5.378 5.350 6.266 5.685 6.94 7.63
I
I-J/Ytl 14.4 14.90 15.05 13.80 16.18 17.10 18.10 15.37 15.36 15.84 18.77 14.25 15.56 14,00
1
budget Deficit 
is l  GDPU3)
4.7 4.5 4.6 4.4 4.60 4.50 9.80 7.61 10.26 10.6 14,3 12,0 12.82 H.54
let Borrowing
is l  GDP (12)
11,0 7.7 8.3 10.0 13.6 10.8 9.5 12.1 13.-3 |




























































































Appendix A: Stability Conditions
A second order system: 
p a n  ai2
x = x = Ax
L  Q 2 1  Q 2 2  J
is asymptotically stable if and only if the roots of the
characteristic polynominal
a (A) = A2 - (an+a2j)* + det(A)
have negative real parts. The conditions for this are:
tr(A) = a n  + a3a > 0 
det(A) = aiia2 2 - ai2a2 i > 0
In order to have the saddle-path property with one positive 
and one negative root the condition is simply:



























































































Appendix B: DATA SOURCES
1. Foreign Debt: OECD: Surveys on Externa 1 Debt. 1983 and 1989.
In the 1983 publication total debt in 1982 was 8842 $m, but
this has been revised into 9801 $m in the publication of 1988. 
Figures reported are slightly lower (on the average by 3.8%) 
than the figures reported for the years 1985-87 in the Finnal 
Director's Report by the Bank of Greece (1988).
2. Dollar Exchange Rate: Average fixing rates, published by the
Statistical Bulletin. Bank of Greece. 1988.
3. GDP at Factor Cost Market Prices: National Accounts. Greece.
4. GDP at Market Prices: European Economy: Annual Economic Report 
1988-89, EEC Commission, November 1988. (Table 4).
5. Price deflator of Gross Domestic Product at market prices: 
ibid (Table 23)
6. Price deflator of private consumption: ibid (Table 24)
7. Growth rate : ibid (Table 10)
8. German Inflation Rate: ibid (Table 23)
9. USA Inflation Rate: ibid (Table 23)
10. Long Term interest rate, Germany: ibid (Table 47)
11. Long Term interest rate, USA: ibid (Table 47)
12. Net borrowing of Central Government: ibid (Table 55)
13. Budget Deficit: Statistical Bulletin. Bank of Greece, 1988.
14. Money Supply: ibid.
15. Domestic Debt: Bank of Greece. Longrun Statistical Series,
1989.
16. Trade Deficit: Compiled from quarterly data. Bank of Greece.
Tables.
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